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This policy contribution summarises a communication entitled “A policy insight into the 
R&D-patent relationship” presented at Industry Canada in their Distinguished Speakers in 
Economics Series, Ottawa, Canada, 18 April, 2008. It argues that the number of priority 
filings should be used as a patent-based measure of Europe’s innovation performance. It also 
identifies several policies that may affect the R&D-patent relationship. 
 
 
 
 
Patent-based indicators at the country level are frequently used to assess countries’ 
innovation performance or effort. Yet they are often said to reflect the propensity to patent 
rather than actual research productivity. We argue that patent-based indicators can rightly be 
used to measure research productivity, as witnessed by the influence of several policy tools on 
the R&D-patent relationship. We also put forward a new counting methodology, less subject 
to ‘home bias’. 
 
Research scholars specialised in the empirical analysis of innovation systems generally 
consider patents as an imperfect indicator of research efforts. Mansfield (1986) and Griliches 
(1990), amongst others, underlined that not all inventions are patentable…and not all 
patentable inventions are patented. In addition, a patentable invention can be protected with 
one single patent, several patents, or a large set of overlapping patents (patent thickets), and 
this ‘propensity to patent’ greatly differs across industries and types of firms. The motivations 
behind patenting are shifting from the traditional use of protecting one’s own innovations to 
new strategic uses (cf. Guellec et al., 2007), further complicating the interpretation of patent 
data. At least the heterogeneity in propensity to patent casts some doubt on the relevance of 
patent-based indicators for the measurement of innovation performances. Yet they are 
commonly used by international organisations to rank countries according to their relative 
innovation effort or performance.
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As a matter of fact, two components characterise the R&D-patent relationship: a 
‘productivity’ effect (the number of inventions generated by each researcher) and a 
‘propensity’ effect (the extent to which an invention is protected with one or several patents). 
In a recent paper (de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe, 2008), we present empirical 
evidence suggesting that patent-based indicators also measure the productivity of research, 
provided an accurate measure of patenting activity is used and the role of several policy tools 
                                                 
1 Examples include the IMD ‘World Competitiveness Yearbook’ (2006); Eurostat, ‘Science, technology and 
innovation in Europe’; or the Economist Intelligence Unit.   2
is accounted for. The next section presents a new patent count methodology based on priority 
filings. We then investigate the extent to which our indicator correlates with research effort. It 
turns out that the design of intellectual property (IP) and sciences and technology (S&T) 
policies do influence the R&D-patent relationship. 
 
 
Measuring a country’s innovative effort with patents 
 
There is no perfect way to assess innovation effort. Although frequently criticised, the most 
common indicators are the level of R&D expenditure and the number of patents. R&D 
expenditure represents an input in the innovation process, whereas patent counts measure one 
particular type of output. There is a well-accepted measurement method for R&D effort and 
harmonised yearly series are provided by the OECD.
2 By contrast, there exists no standard 
methodology for patent data (see eg Dernis et al., 2001). It is possible to compute a large 
number of patent-based indicators, each meaning something different. 
 
Assessing a country’s patenting performance is more complex than might appear at first sight. 
Most studies generally rely on patent filings either at the European Patent Office (EPO) or at 
the US Patent and trademark Office (USPTO), but this practice induces a strong ‘home bias’. 
USPTO filings include domestic priority filings from US firms and filings from abroad. 
Needless to say many more applications can be expected from US firms than from European 
firms. The reverse is true with the EPO, where European firms have a much higher propensity 
to file a patent application than US firms. In addition, EPO filings are generally second 
filings: they do not account for the original priority filings that are made beforehand (cf. 
Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2007).  
 
An alternative approach is to rely on the number of priority filings made by the residents of a 
country. To the best of our knowledge, this counting methodology has rarely been adopted. It 
is not straightforward to implement, as the firms of a country may choose several routes to file 
their priority applications. It is particularly true in Europe, where the EPO co-exists with 
national patent offices, and where firms sometimes first file an application at the USPTO and 
then transfer it to the EPO. A ‘correct’ (or less biased) methodology would therefore consist 
of counting the number of priority patents filed at different national or regional patent offices. 
In the case of the Netherlands, for example, 2,298 priority filings were made to the national 
patent office in 2003 (EPO’s PATSTAT database, April 2007). During the same year Dutch 
applicants filed 495 priority filings at the EPO, and 594 priority applications at the USPTO. In 
other words, a total of 3,387 filings were made by firms based in the Netherlands, a net 
increase of more than 1,000 patents.   
 
Neglecting EPO or USPTO filings may result in large biases, as Figure 1 points out, 
especially for Belgium, Canada, India, the Netherlands, Singapore, and Switzerland. The 
corrected count is reported on the right-hand side of the figure. As compared with the 
methodology that consists of counting only USPTO or EPO filings, this alternative counting 
methodology has the advantage of being less subject to home bias, because three routes for 
priority filings are accounted for (national, EPO and USPTO). An alternative methodology 
that would also correct the home bias would be to count triadic patents, ie patents that have 
been filed simultaneously at the USPTO, the EPO and the JPO. It is an indicator developed by 
                                                 
2 See the Frascati Manual published by the OECD for technical information on R&D, and the Main Science and 
Technology Indicators as well as the ANBERD database for yearly series.   3
the OECD that essentially tracks patents with a very high potential value (as they are filed in 
three patent offices). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2008). Note that the number of Japanese priority 
filings has been divided by 3, as Japanese patents are on average composed of far fewer claims, about 8 in 2003, 
as opposed to 24 in the patents filed at the USPTO). A similar approach has been adopted for South Korean 
patents. For a discussion, see de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2008). 
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the results of various counting methodologies (on the right-hand side) 
compared to two well-known indicators of R&D effort (on the left-hand side): gross 
expenditure on research and development (R&D spending) and the number of full-time 
equivalent (FTE) researchers. The home bias clearly appears for patent counts based on EPO 
or USPTO data. Filings by European (US) applicants are much more numerous with EPO 
(USPTO) data than the number of researchers or the level of R&D spending would predict. 
Figure 1 - Priority filings in 2003, by route of application
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Triadic patents and priority filings are more in line with the two indicators of R&D activities, 
with Japan being overrepresented in both cases. In other words, patent counts based on the 
corrected number of priority filings or on the number of triadic patents seem to provide a 
more accurate measure of relative research efforts. It is worth noting that the total number of 
priority filings generated in Europe, Japan and the US is around 400,000, whereas the total 
number of triadic patents is around 44,000, suggesting that about one patent out of nine is 
associated with a high value that justifies a global protection strategy. 
 
 
Japan. This counting metodology evidently focus on patens with a high potential value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: cf. de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2008); OECD MSTI, USPTO 2003 annual report, EPO 2003 
annual report, own computation. Note that the number of Japanese priority filings has been divided by 3, as 
Japanese patents are on average composed of far fewer claims, about 8 in 2003, as opposed to 24 in the patents 
filed at the USPTO). A similar approach has been adopted for South Korean patents. For a discussion, see de 
Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2008). 
 
Figure 3 shows the corrected count of priority filings per million inhabitants. Germany is the 
only European country to perform as well as the US, while EU15 clearly lags behind. The  
following sections summarise the factors that impact countries’ patenting performance. 
 
Figure 3 - Corrected priority filings per million inhabitants 
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Source: adapted from de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2008) 
Figure 2 - Research effort (left) versus patenting activity (right) 
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The ‘R&D-patent’ relationship... 
 
A first glimpse into the R&D-patent relationship is provided by Figures 4 and 5, where the 
number of full-time equivalent (FTE) researchers is plotted against the corrected counts of 
priority filings. A clear positive relationship between the number of researchers and the 
number of patents applied for appears, but it is subject to substantial heterogeneity. Countries 
like the US, Japan, Germany, South Korea, Great Britain and Australia are markedly ‘above’ 
the line. In other words, firms in these countries patent more than the number of researchers 
would predict. The EU15 is slightly under the line, as are France, Spain, Canada, Russia, 
India or China. These differences may be due either to varying propensities to patent or to 
varying productivity levels of research activities.  
 
Figure 4 - FTE researchers in 2003 vs corrected priority filings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2008) 
 
 
The extent to which countries apply for more or fewer patents than the number of researchers 
would predict has been analysed by de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2008). The 
authors argue that the relationship between research effort (measured by the number of full-
time equivalent researchers) and the number of priority filings depends on both a research 
productivity effect and a propensity effect.  
 
In order to test the role of the productivity and propensity effects, the authors have performed 
a cross-sectional econometric analysis of 34 countries, representing more than 95% of 
worldwide priority filings. The results suggest that the two effects explain the observed 
heterogeneity in the number of patents per researcher, as witnessed by the impact of the 
design of several policy tools. The most important results are summarised as follows. 
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Source: adapted from de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2008) 
 
 
... depends on a research productivity effect 
 
The design of education policies and S&T policies influence the R&D-patent relationship 
through a ‘productivity’ effect. 
 
•  The higher the human capital index is (or the more educated a country is), the 
more productive the research effort is. In other words, countries with a more educated 
population have more priority filings per researcher. In this respect, Finland, Sweden 
and Austria score the highest, whereas India, China and Turkey score the lowest.
3 
 
•  The  number of scientific publications per researcher, an indicator of research 
quality, also has a positive impact on the observed number of patents. Switzerland, 
Italy and the Netherlands have the highest performances, while China, Russia, and 
Japan lag behind. 
 
•  Gross expenditure on R&D per researcher is an additional determinant of the 
productivity of research. It seems that better-equipped – or better-paid – researchers 
are more productive in terms of patent filings. Italian, Dutch and Swiss researchers 
enjoy the highest relative expenditure, Russian, Polish and Slovakian researchers the 
lowest.  
 
The three results suggest that patent indicators partly reflect the productivity of research 
effort. The design of a number of policies has a substantial influence on research productivity 
and therefore affects the R&D-patent relationship. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Please refer to de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2008) for the complete dataset. 
Figure 5 - FTE researchers in 2003 vs corrected priority filings, countries with less than 
150,000 FTE researchers. 
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0 50 100 150
Thousands of FTE Researchers in 2003
T
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
s
 
o
f
 
p
a
t
e
n
t
s
IN
CA
ES
AU
PL
IT
BR
Slope: 0,12*researchers - 2,2  7
… and a propensity effect 
 
Patent-based indicators also reflect varying propensity to patent across countries. In particular, 
intellectual property policies play an important role in fostering the demand for patents. 
 
•  Patenting fees are a significant determinant of the demand for patents: a reduction of 
about 10% in patenting fees would result in an increase in patent filings of 3 to 5%. 
See de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2007) for an in-depth discussion about the 
role of fees on patenting behaviour.  
 
•  Stronger patent rights, such as better enforcement mechanisms, a lower number of 
restrictions or more patentable subject-matter stimulate inventors to file more patent 
applications. It is measured by the Ginarte-Park index on the strength of patent rights. 
 
•  A country’s industrial structure also matters. For the same level of aggregate R&D 
intensity, specialisation in the computer or the electronic instruments industry leads to 
proportionally more patent filings.  
 
The above-mentioned factors constitute pitfalls that make patent-based indicators an 
imperfect measure of productivity of research: two countries with a similar productivity of 
research effort but with varying IP policies or technological specialisation may exhibit major 
differences in patenting performance. Nevertheless, patent data also reflect the productivity of 
research effort, as witnessed by the impact of education and S&T policies on the R&D-patent 
relationship.  
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